Negative mood state impairs false memory priming when problem-solving by Knott, L. et al.
Knott, L., Threadgold, E. & Howe, M. L. (2014). Negative mood state impairs false memory priming 
when problem-solving. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 26(5), pp. 580-587. doi: 
10.1080/20445911.2014.922091 
City Research Online
Original citation: Knott, L., Threadgold, E. & Howe, M. L. (2014). Negative mood state impairs 
false memory priming when problem-solving. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 26(5), pp. 580-587. 
doi: 10.1080/20445911.2014.922091 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/4185/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  Mood and False Memory Priming 
 
 1 
Running Head: MOOD AND FALSE MEMORY PRIMING 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative mood state impairs false memory priming when problem-solving  
Lauren M. Knott, Emma Threadgold, and Mark L. Howe  
City University London 
 
 
Address correspondence to:  Dr Lauren Knott  
    Department of Psychology 
    City University London 
    London, EC1V 0HB 
    Phone: +44 (0)20 7040 3354 
    E-mail: lauren.knott.1@city.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
In Press:  Journal of Cognitive Psychology  
  Mood and False Memory Priming 
 
 2 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of emotional mood states on the 
ability to create effective primes using the recently developed false memory priming 
paradigm. A negative or positive mood state was induced before Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) list presentation. A further control group experienced no mood 
induction. Participants were then presented with Compound Remote Associate Task 
(CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the previous DRM lists whose 
critical lure was the solution to the CRAT problem. The results of this study showed 
that induction of a negative mood state not only impaired recall of critical lures but 
also diminished their effectiveness as primes for solving CRAT problems. In contrast, 
for both positive mood and control conditions, the false memory priming advantage 
was evident, with a higher proportion of primed problems solved in comparison to 
those not primed. Findings are discussed in relation to the role of affect on semantic 
activation and the adaptive consequences of false memories. 
 
Key words: False memory, problem solving, affective mood state, DRM paradigm, 
priming
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Negative mood state impairs false memory priming when problem-solving 
 
 Negative mood states have been linked to poor decision-making and problem-
solving abilities (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1998), deficits in attention (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2007), and memory impairments (Blaney, 1986). Concerning the latter, studies 
have previously examined the effect of mood on true memories, but research on the 
effects of negative mood on false memories has just begun. A robust method used to 
examine false memories in this line of research is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) paradigm (Deese 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  Here, participants are 
presented with list items (e.g., table, sit, couch, desk) that are all highly associated with 
a non-presented critical lure item (e.g., chair). After presentation, participants are 
asked to recall or recognize the list items in subsequent memory tests. A false memory 
is recorded if the participant reports the thematically related but non-presented critical 
lure. These false memories are considered to be spontaneous, occurring automatically 
and without conscious awareness (Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009). 
According to the associative activation theory (Howe et al., 2009) they occur due to 
automatic spreading activation through associative networks. Activation from concepts 
contained within the lists spreads to related but unpresented concepts in memory. 
Related words are then activated at encoding and falsely recalled at retrieval. 
 Storbeck and Clore (2005) conducted two experiments using the DRM 
paradigm. Temporary mood states were induced prior to encoding the DRM lists. 
Results showed that negative affect reduced false memories, while positive affect 
produced similar levels of false memories as control conditions. Storbeck and Clore 
hypothesised that affective mood states could influence the production of false 
memories.. They argued that negative affect was associated with more item-specific 
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processing of information leaving relational processing somewhat impaired, something 
that has been found to increase rates of true recollection and reduce false memories 
(Howe, 2008). In comparison, the positive affect provided feelings of efficacy, which 
validates the use of relational processing styles. Such processing coupled with a 
reduced item-specific approach leads to increases in false recollection (Howe, 2008). 
As mentioned earlier, for adults at least, associative activation occurs automatically 
and without conscious awareness (Howe et al., 2009). Relational processing allows for 
this automatic and unconscious activation, while item-specific processing is more 
controlled, thus, inhibiting the automatic spreading activation, necessary for false 
memory production in the DRM paradigm. 
The influence of emotions and mood on cognitive processing also extends to 
problem solving. For instance, research has shown that individuals in a positive mood 
produce more unusual associations in a word association task (Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & 
Robinson, 1985), are able to form more inclusive categories in a sorting task (Isen & 
Daubman, 1984), and can facilitate creativity on Duncker’s (1945) candle task and 
Mednick, Mednick, and Mednick’s (1964) Compound Remote Associate Task 
(CRAT). A study by Bolte, Goschke, and Kuhl (2003) examined the influence of 
affective mood state on the ability to make intuitive judgments about the coherence of 
a word triad. Bolte et al. (2003) presented participants with word triads (e.g., playing, 
credit, report), and asked participants to decide whether they were coherent (shared a 
common solution word- card), or whether they were incoherent, with no common 
solution word. In Experiment 2, a positively induced mood improved intuitive 
coherence judgments, whereas a negative mood impaired performance to chance level.   
The theoretical framework that underlies these findings follows a similar 
explanation to that used in the false memory literature. In what Bolte et al. (2003) 
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referred to as the affect-modulation hypothesis, positive affect promotes global 
processing and results in the automatic spreading activation to weak associates. 
Spreading activation improves the ability to solve word triads and make intuitive 
coherence judgements. In contrast, the more item-specific processing associated with 
negative affect, restricts the automatic spread of activation to close associates and 
impairs the ability to solve word triads and make intuitive coherence judgements.  
CRAT problems require the process of spreading activation through semantic 
networks until the target concept (word) has been activated (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, 
Fleck, & Koumios, 2005). Aiding the associative activation and “priming” the target 
concept has been the recent interest of research by Howe and colleagues (e.g., Howe, 
Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010; Howe, 
Garner, & Patel, 2013). These studies have shown that false recall of critical lures can 
prime solutions to CRAT problems when the solution word is also the critical lure. 
Typically, participants are presented with DRM lists whose critical lures are primes for 
half of the to be solved CRATs. Results have shown that when participants recall the 
critical lure, they are more likely to solve the corresponding CRAT and do so more 
quickly than those that were not primed. Importantly, previous research has also shown 
that the priming effect is not just an artifact of increased activation of a critical lure at 
test. Even in the absence of the recall task, participants still performed better on 
CRATs that were primed by a critical lure belonging to the presentation of a prior 
DRM list (Howe et al., 2010, 2011, 2013). Thus, the priming advantage is likely due to 
participants having generated the critical lure during list encoding and it is the false 
memory generation that is the source of these priming effects. 
Howe and colleagues situated these findings in the emerging adaptive view of 
memory illusions (see Howe, 2011, for a review). Previous research has shown a 
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memory benefit for survival information and survival processing (Nairne, 2010) that 
has now been extended to the false memory literature. Howe and Derbish (2010, 2014) 
argued that because false memories are formed by the same reconstructive memory 
system, survival-related processing of information that primes highly interconnected 
concepts and promotes relational processing will inevitably lead to more false 
memories for survival related information. The recent false memory priming effect 
seen with CRATs could be an example of this adaptive function of memory (both true 
and false) as it serves to prime complex problem solving. Indeed Klein, Cosmides, 
Tooby and Chance (2002) proposed that implicit priming serves as an adaptive 
function in that memory serves to support future problem solving. This is evidenced in 
recent research by Howe and colleagues, where false memories function to prime and 
aid problem solving (Howe et al., 2010, 2011, 2013). 
Here we see that the byproduct of memory activation can provide significant 
advantages to more complex cognitive processes such as insight-based problem 
solving. However, if processing of information were more controlled and item-specific 
in nature, unlike what we see with survival processing, would the inhibited associative 
activation not only impair false recall but also impair the subsequent ability to solve 
CRAT problems? We know that affective mood states influence processing conditions. 
Positive affect promotes relational processing and automatic spreading activation, 
whereas negative affect inhibits relational processing and leads to more controlled, 
item-specific processing that impairs semantic association and spreading activation. A 
mood state that impairs relational processing will ultimately inhibit survival processing 
and hinder the adaptive memory consequence for future problem solving.  Thus, the 
question is whether the use of a mood induction technique during DRM study-recall 
phase not only impair or enhance, depending on mood state, false memory production 
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but also the ability to use false memories to aid problem solving on subsequent 
CRATs?  
 In order to investigate this question, participants completed DRM study-test 
trials while in a positive or negative mood state. A control condition was also used to 
aid comparison with previous research. All participants completed a series of CRAT 
problems, half of which had their solution primed by the associated critical lure of the 
DRM lists, and half of which had not been primed. As previous research has shown, a 
negative mood state should be associated with more item specific processing which 
could hinder automatic associative activation, thus not only reduce false recall, but also 
reduce the chance that the critical lure can be accessed and used to prime the CRAT 
problem. This will lessen the priming advantage and lead to similar levels of problem 
solving across both primed and unprimed CRATs. As positive mood states typically 
enhance relational processing and thus automatic spreading activation, the priming 
effect should occur, and problems will be solved more readily and more quickly when 
primed than not primed. 
Method 
Participants. 
  Seventy-two undergraduate students (47 females) aged 18-45 (M = 19.85, SD = 
4.09) participated in this study for course credit. 
Design and Stimuli. 
 The experiment followed a 3(mood condition: Positive, Negative, and Control) 
x 2(Prime type: false memory prime vs. unprimed) design with repeated measures on 
the second factor. During the DRM study-recall stage participants were randomly 
assigned to one of 3 mood conditions, Positive, (n =  22) Negative, (n =  26) and 
Control (n = 24). 
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 Mood induction. Mood was induced using two five-minute video clips. Film 
clips were chosen as they are considered to produce more complex emotional states 
(Aldao, 2013). The negative mood group watched the final scene of the movie The 
Champ, while the positive mood group watched a comedy sketch from Live at the 
Apollo (see Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007, for films that elicit emotion). The control 
group began the study in their natural mood state. Participant’s mood was assessed 
using the Self-Assessment Manikin scale (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994).  The SAM is 
a non-verbal pictorial assessment technique that uses a 9-point Likert scale to directly 
measure a person’s affective state. Low values represent a negative mood, while high 
values represent a positive mood. Mood measures were taken before and after the 
initial film clip to ensure successful mood induction. Participants in the control 
condition completed this before beginning the study phase for a base line measure of 
their natural mood state. For comparative purposes, it should be noted that neutral 
moods are generally slightly higher than the midpoint of the scale (e.g., 6.20). 
 DRM and CRAT stimuli. Eight CRAT problems were taken from Bowden and 
Jung-Beeman (2003) and considered to be of medium difficulty according to normed 
solution rates (average normed solution rate = 60.63%). Each CRAT consisted of three 
words, all of which required a single word to create a compound word or phrase. For 
example, rocking, wheel, high, could all be solved by the word chair (DRM lists and 
associated CRAT problems can be found in the Appendix). The eight chosen DRM 
lists consisted of 12 associates to the critical lure that also acted as the solution word 
for the selected CRAT problems. DRM lists were taken from Roediger & McDermott 
(1995) and randomly divided into two sets of four. Each participant was shown one set 
of lists. This allowed for 4 CRAT solutions to be primed by the critical lures and four 
to remain unprimed. Normed solution rate of CRATs and backward associative 
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strength (BAS) were equated across sets. To avoid any mood congruency effects that 
may have inflated critical lures in the negative and positive mood conditions (see Ruci 
et al., 2009), DRM lists with neutral valance were chosen (M =  5.85). Valence ratings 
were taken from Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW: Bradley & Lang, 1999).   
Procedure 
 After mood induction and assessment were complete, participants were 
presented with four DRM lists in randomised order. Each list was recorded and 
presented to the participant verbally. At the end of each list participants completed a 
distractor task (complete basic sums for 30s) and then recalled as many words as they 
could remember from the list. On completion of the study-test trials participants were 
provided with verbal instructions on how to solve the CRATs followed by two practice 
CRAT problems and the 8 test CRATs. Each CRAT was presented on the computer 
screen, in a random order. When participants knew the solution they were instructed to 
press ENTER and input their word. Participants were allowed multiple attempts at 
solving the CRAT, but if they were unable to solve the problem after 60s, the computer 
programme would provide feedback on the correct answer and move on to the next 
problem.    
Results 
Mood-manipulation Check  
For the mood manipulation check mood assessment scores taken pre and post  
video presentation were compared for negative and positive mood groups using a 
2(Mood Condition: Positive vs. Negative) x 2(Valence score: Before vs. After video 
presentation) mixed factor ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. A 
significant interaction, F(1,46) = 57.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .56 was further analysed using 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons. For the negative mood group, valence significantly 
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decreased pre (M =  6.31, SD =1.93) and post (M = 3.73, SD = 1.63) video (p <  .001), 
and increased for the positive mood group (M = 6.86, SD =  1.49 vs. M = 7.77, SD =  
1.02, p < .05).   A mood check to include all three mood conditions (the control group 
did not see a video presentation thus a valence score was only recorded before the 
onset of the study-test DRM phase) showed a significant effect, F(2,69) = 59.93, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .64 whereby mood assessment was higher for positive compared to 
negative, (M = 7.77, SD =  1.02 vs. M = 3.73, SD = 1.63, p < .001), and control 
compared to negative (M = 7.08, SD =  1.38, p < .001), but no difference between 
positive and control (p = .22). 
False and True Recall 
 False recall of critical lures. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted to examine the effect of mood-group (positive, negative, and control) on 
recall of critical lures (CLs). The main effect of mood was significant, F(2,69) = 6.91, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .17. Further analysis of pairwise comparisons revealed that both positive 
(M = .33, SD = .16) and control (M = .40, SD = .23) mood groups recalled significantly 
more critical lures than the negative mood group (M = .19, SD = .19, p < .05 for both). 
 True recall. A second one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference in 
correct recall between positive (M = .56, SD = .08) negative (M = .61, SD = .13) and 
control (M = .59, SD = .10) mood groups, F(2,69) = 1.11, p = .34, ηp2 = .03. An effect 
not unexpected given that item-specific processing is available for veridical recall in 
the negative mood condition (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). 
CRAT Problem Solving 
 Both CRAT solution rates (proportion correctly solved) and mean CRAT 
solution times (in seconds) were analysed using a 3(Mood Condition: Positive, 
Negative, and Control) x 3(Prime Type: Primed CL vs. Primed no CL vs. Unprimed) 
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mixed factor ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. Here, primed 
CRAT problems were conditionalised on whether participants had produced the critical 
lure during recall (i.e., Primed CL = critical lure produced and Primed/no CL = no 
critical lure produced). Due to the conditionalization of the Prime Type for analysis, 
data was only included if a CL was produced at the DRM study-test trials (Positive n =  
21, Negative n =  18 and Control n = 21). 
 Solution rates for CRATs. There was a significant main effect of Prime type, 
F(2, 114) = 7.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, but no significant main effect of mood, F(2,57) = 
1.73, p = .19, ηp2 = .06. However, there was a significant Mood x Prime Type 
interaction, F(4,114) = 2.59, p < .05, ηp2 = .08. Further analysis of the simple main 
effects (SMEs) revealed a significant prime effect for positive mood, F(2,40) = 6.30, p 
< .05, ηp2 = .24 and control groups, F(2,40) = 6.27, p < .05, ηp2 = .24, whereby more 
CRATs were correctly solved in the primed CL compared to primed no CL and 
unprimed conditions for both groups. However, there was no effect of priming for the 
negative mood condition, F(2,34) = .18, p = .84, ηp2 = .01 (see Figure 1).  Solution 
rates for both positive mood and control conditions show a similar pattern to that found 
in previous research, whereby, more CRATs were solved when the CL prime was 
produced during the study-test DRM phase. For the negative mood group, not only 
were fewer critical lures produced during the study-test trails, but when they were 
produced, they led to fewer primed solutions compared to the positive mood and 
control conditions.   
Solution times for CRATs. Solution times were calculated and analysed where 
CRATs were solved in all three priming conditions. Analysis of solution times (in 
seconds) for CRATs revealed a significant main effect of prime type, F(2,74) = 4.07, p 
< .05 ηp2 = .10, with faster solution times in the primed CL (M =  8.30, SD =  3.71) 
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compared to unprimed (M =  13.80, SD =  10.18 p <  .05) and primed no CL (M =  
12.62, SD =  9.69, although this was marginal, p =  .06) conditions. There was no main 
effect of mood condition, F(2,37) = .22, p = .80, ηp2 = .01, and no Mood x Prime Type 
interaction, F(4,70) = .51 p = .73, ηp2 = .03 (see Table 1). Faster solution times for 
CRATs primed by a critical lure supports findings from previous research (e.g., Howe 
et al., 2010, 2011, 2013). There was no significant Mood x Prime Type interaction, 
however this is expected, as solution times were analysed only where CRATs were 
solved in all three priming conditions.  
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the influence of mood state on false 
memories and the subsequent effect this may have on the recently discovered priming 
advantage for insight-based problem solving. First, the results from this experiment 
support previous findings that claim affect can influence false memory production in 
the DRM paradigm (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Participants in the negative mood 
group produced fewer critical lures at recall in comparison to the positive mood and 
control groups. These results are in line with current theories that claim negative affect 
triggers item-specific processing. Encoding under such conditions inhibits automatic 
and unconscious spreading activation to related associates reducing the activation of 
the critical lure. In comparison, positive affect triggers relational processing, which 
enhances automaticity and the unconscious spreading activation to related critical lures 
increasing false memory production. Akin to previous findings (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 
2005) there was no difference in false recall between the positive affect and control 
groups. Typically, control groups display quite a positive affective state that may not 
differ to a positively induced mood. Furthermore, relational processing is considered to 
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be the default processing style for any nonnegative emotional state (see Storbeck & 
Clore, 2005). 
With a negatively induced mood, impaired automatic associative activation not 
only reduces the production of critical lures but also prevents those critical lures from 
coming to mind in subsequent problem solving. That is, the critical lure, when 
produced in the negative mood condition, did not act as a successful prime as negative 
affect induced prior to learning promotes item-specific processing that inhibits 
automatic associative activation. This reduction in activation of related concepts in 
memory also impairs access to the critical lure during subsequent problem solving.  
This led to solution rates that were identical to conditions in which there was no 
priming. For both positive mood and control conditions, the priming advantage was 
evident and significantly more primed problems were solved than those that were not 
primed. These conditions promote the use of relational processing that leads to the 
automatic and unconscious activation of semantic associates. This heightened 
activation of the critical lure primes the subsequent solution to the CRAT problem. 
These findings support and extend the recent research by Howe and colleagues that 
false memories facilitate problem solving in CRATs due to spreading activation in 
semantic networks (e.g., Howe et al., 2010, 2013).  
Speed of problem solving was also faster when primed than when not primed. 
However our solution time data showed no interaction with mood state. This is not 
unexpected, as solution times for participants were only analysed where CRATs were 
solved in all three priming conditions.  Coupled with typically large variances in 
response times (see Standard Error values in Table 1), this may require further 
investigation. However it is unclear what the effect of mood state on priming will be. 
For example, previous research has shown that participants respond faster (in an 
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evaluation or category selection task) in the positive compared to negative mood 
groups when primes are affectively and semantically congruent compared to 
incongruent. Note however, this is a comparison of the priming effect (congruent 
words allow for faster responses then incongruent words) and not just the effect of 
mood state per se (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). 
In relation to previous research, it appears that a negative mood state can impair 
priming due to item-specific processing that inhibits automatic activation of associative 
networks. In comparison, situations that promote more relational processing further 
facilitate the false memory priming effect. For example, Howe et al. (2013) found that 
false memories for survival-related information made better primes for problem 
solving than neutral false memory primes. We know that survival related processing of 
information primes networks of highly interconnected concepts that results in high 
false memory rates for survival information. This in turn allows for better access to 
false memories during later problem solving, highlighting the adaptive, functional 
nature of memory. From a spreading activation perspective, survival processing makes 
for better priming due to the promotion of relational processing and strongly 
interrelated concepts. In contrast, the present findings demonstrate that processing 
(neutral) information in a negative mood leads to a reduction in priming due to 
impaired relational processing and automatic, associative activation.  
It is perhaps key to note here that even though survival relevant material can be 
negative in valence (Howe et al., 2013), it can still enhance the automatic activation of 
associative networks, increasing critical lure production and access to these critical 
lures during later problem solving. In comparison, a negative mood hinders the 
priming effect due to the reliance on item specific processing that impairs associative 
activation and later access to critical lures. There is an important distinction here – in 
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survival processing the stimuli are highly interrelated and by their nature, relevant to 
the self and congruent to a survival processing encoding state. This heightens the 
activation of the survival congruent stimuli through excitation of the related semantic 
network. This increases the likelihood that related but non-presented information 
becomes activated and subsequently falsely remembered at test, a finding consistent 
with Semantic Network Theory (Bower, 1981). What we have yet to examine is a 
mood congruent effect in the false memory priming advantage. Based on these findings 
and those from previous studies (Ruci et al., 2009), negative mood may be linked to an 
increase in activation level for negatively relevant concepts that could in turn lead to 
enhanced accessibility of this information in memory (Howe & Malone, 2011). This 
will require further investigation.  
These findings, along with others (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 2008) support 
assumptions that affect influences the accessibility of semantic associations in 
memory. More specifically negative mood can hinder the relational processing that 
usually facilitates the automatic unconscious spreading activation to relevant semantic 
concepts and reduce access to relevant primes for later problem solving. This reduction 
in accessibility to semantic associations provides further support for the theoretical 
explanation of false memory priming effects. That is, relational processing enhances 
automatic spreading activation to related semantic networks and heightens accessibility 
to related, but not presented words. The end result being that a false memory can aid 
problem solving and prime the solution to an insight-based problem. To conclude, this 
research adds to the literature on the more positive consequences of false memory 
production, in that we can use them to aid and prime the solution to complex insight 
based problems. Not only does this research demonstrate the powerful nature of our 
reconstructive memory system (Howe, 2011), it is a welcome relief from research that 
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typically refers to false memory production as a negative consequence of human 
cognition (e.g., errors in eyewitness testimonies). 
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Table 1. Mean solution times as a function of mood condition and prime type (primed 
vs. unprimed). 
 Mood Condition 
 Negative  Positive  Neutral  
Prime CL 
Prime no CL 
8.19 (1.14) 
9.73 (2.95) 
8.36 (.95) 
14.15 (2.44) 
8.32 (1.06) 
13.19 (2.71) 
Unprimed 15.39 (3.13) 13.88 (2.60) 12.36 (2.88) 
 
Note: SE in parentheses 
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Figure 1. Mean solution rates as a function of mood condition and prime type. Error 
bars represent standard error (SE).  
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APPENDIX 
DRM lists and associated CRAT problems (critical lure/CRAT solution in CAPS) 
 
CRAT Problem 
 
DRM list 
chase/police/toy CAR - truck, bus, automobile, vehicle, drive, jeep, Ford, 
keys, garage, highway, van, taxi 
salad/bowl/juice FRUIT - apple, vegetable, orange, kiwi, citrus, ripe, pear, 
banana, berry, cherry, basket, cocktail 
shop/washer/frame WINDOW - door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, house, 
curtain, view, breeze, screen, shutter 
 
leg/wheel/high CHAIR - table, sit, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, cushion, 
swivel, stool, rocking, bench 
knife/tip/pal PEN - pencil, write, fountain, leak, quill, Bic, scribble, 
crayon, cross, marker, cap, letter 
drinking/tea/cake CUP - mug, saucer, measuring, coaster, lid, handle, coffee, 
soup, drink, plastic, sip 
football/flannel/vest SHIRT - blouse, sleeves, pants, tie, button, shorts, polo, 
collar, pocket, belt, linen, cuffs 
base/territorial/boot ARMY - Navy, soldier, United States, rifle, air force, 
military, Marines, infantry, captain, war, uniform, combat 
 
